

CHAPTER 40

Organizational Behavior

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Organizational behavior (OB) is the study of how people think, feel, and act in organizations and similarly, how they are affected by the activities within organizations. OB is interested in the behavior of people embedded in specific contexts of organizational systems. Within this definition, there are three important levels of analysis that guide the field: the individual, the team, and the organization. Not surprisingly, OB has much in common with social psychology; however, the context of application—the organizational environment—is much more defined than it is in social psychology.

In this chapter, we highlight the key themes and principles that guide the study of OB, paying particular attention to the ways in which OB has been influenced by social psychology. We organize our chapter around the three key levels of analysis that undergird the study of OB. The first level of analysis within OB is that of the organizational actor as an independent decision maker or leader. Within this section, we focus on decision making, psychological contracts, justice and fairness, and, of course, leadership. We appreciate that all the concepts just listed do not occur in a social vacuum and therefore might very well occur in the context of teams and decision making in organizations; what is common among these phenomena, however, is that they are considered properties or characteristics of the organizational actor.

A second level of analysis considers the organizational actor as a team member. Within this section, we delve into perhaps what is considered to be the fundamental building block of most organizations and companies: the team. We are careful to draw a clear distinction between

groups as they are commonly studied in the social psychology literature and teams as they are studied in the OB literature. In this section, we analyze the key processes of negotiation and teamwork. A final level of analysis is that of the organization in which actors are embedded. More than any other section, this is where social psychology and organizational behavior often part company.

Threaded throughout our discussion of these key themes in organizational behavior, we articulate the two key considerations facing the OB researcher: methodology and application. In terms of methodology, we argue that in contrast to social psychology, wherein there is near universal agreement that the laboratory method is necessary and (perhaps) sufficient, that considerably more methodological variety exists in OB. Accordingly, we are careful to point domains in which field researchers have placed a “flag” and domains in which lab researchers have claimed territory. In some cases, the subject matter necessitates a field study (e.g., organizational downsizing, social networks, and, often, leadership). In terms of application, we argue that in contrast to social psychology, wherein application is often an afterthought, it is a crucial consideration in organizational behavior research. Thoughtful application of principles of OB requires careful consideration of the realities of organizational life, including cost–benefit analysis, reorganization, globalization, and industry developments.

We conclude by considering the future of OB. To that end, we review some of the topics and themes that do not fit neatly into the aforementioned basic processes. We

suggest that in the future, OB will grow more divergent from social psychology, and we explain why we make this prediction using both theory and paradigmatic logic.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ACTOR AS INDEPENDENT THINKER AND DECISION MAKER

The fundamental unit of analysis in OB, like social psychology, is the individual. Whereas OB privileges individual cognition, emotion, and behavior, it pays particular attention to the social and organizational contexts in which they are situated, as well as the consequences of those contexts on social life and social interaction.

One well-developed and highly influential area of research is individual decision making, which is inspired by the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Another important area of OB research is procedural justice—people's reaction to events based on their perceptions of the fairness of relevant processes and outcomes—as well as the behavioral consequences that follow. Finally, OB is interested in how individuals as leaders can understand and manage the cognitive and emotional reactions of their subordinates; thus we also review several theories on leadership.

Decision Making

Within the topic of decision making, there are three identifiable streams of research, including (1) flawed and biased decision making; (2) justification processes and pressures; and (3) organizational boundary effects.

Flawed and Biased Decision Making

This area of research in OB is a direct descendant of the seminal research of March and Simon (1958, 1993) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The fundamental theme is that organizational decision makers, despite being intelligent and presumably motivated by noble and benevolent reasons, are hopelessly victimized by their own nonrational thought processes (for an overview, see Bazerman, 2006). Consequently, although decisions often deviate from what is strictly rational, according to economists, they are somewhat predictable in light of OB decision-making research.

BEHAVIORAL DECISION RESEARCH TRADITION

With their seminal publication, *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) changed the future of management and psychology by ushering in an era of experimental research on descriptive biases. Their book neatly outlined seven types of biases, including representativeness, causality and attribution, availability, covariation and control, overconfidence, multistage evaluation, and risk perception that served as the stage for the next 20 years of research on bias. Whereas bias approach primarily focused on cognitive biases for several years (availability

heuristic, representativeness heuristic, anchoring heuristic, framing bias, endowment effects, etc.), more recent treatments of bias implicate human motivation as a primary source of bias. Examples of biases that have a motivational core include the positive illusion bias, self-serving bias, and judgments that are affected by mood (for a review, see Bazerman, 2006).

The metaphor of the hopelessly “biased” decision maker within micro-organizational behavior has almost exclusively been applied to the individual. Moreover, the great body of research in micro-organizational behavior has relied on the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis. For example, Bazerman's (2006) sixth edition of his book, *Judgment in Managerial Decision Making*, nearly exclusively relies on the individual manager as the source of bias in organizational decision making. However, among macro-organizational theorists, bias occurs at the level of the organization.

BOUNDED RATIONALITY

The concept of bounded rationality was proposed by Herbert Simon (1947) and developed by the Carnegie School (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962; March & Simon, 1958). Simon's fundamental insight is that the extent to which decision making can be rational is limited, or “bounded,” by the fact that decision makers never have access to all the information they need about their alternatives or the consequences of any given decision. Actors therefore satisfice, rather than optimize, and focus their limited attention on a small, rather than expansive, range of issues, which are generally more salient to themselves. Because the situationally and structurally determined attention structures within an organization (Ocasio, 1997) lead the actor to focus on a unique set of issues, which often conflict with those of other actors, and because of the interdependence inherent within organizations, actors are forced to seek coalitions to achieve their goals (March, 1962). Arguing that information-processing capabilities prevent individuals from behaving perfectly rationally, the Carnegie School built a behavioral theory of the firm, dubbed the “garbage can model” of organizational choice.

GARBAGE CAN MODEL

An important implication of bounded rationality at the individual level is that organizational decision making—the outcome of many interdependent individual decisions—cannot itself be rational. Cyert and March (1963) sought to analyze ambiguous behaviors, or behavior that appears to contradict classical theory, at the organizational level. Underlying the garbage can model is the understanding that, when aggregated, bounded rationality leads to extremely uncertain decision environments, where it is impossible to employ classical decision theory.

In addition to bounded rationality, the presence of political coalitions of organizational subunits, conflicting goals, problematic preferences (i.e., the organization as a whole does not have a clear preference ordering), un-

clear technology (i.e., organizational processes are not fully understood by all participants), and fluid participation (i.e., sequential and selective attention to issues leads to different actors being involved in decisions over time) characterize the organizational decision-making environment, which can be termed “organized anarchy” (Cohen et al., 1972). Organizational choice is therefore the result of unique and somewhat unpredictable combinations of problems and solutions facing unique combinations of decision makers at a given point in time. Problems and choices are therefore partially decoupled from one another, and decisions are made only when the combination of problems, solutions, and decision makers facilitates action (Cohen et al., 1972; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1976; March & Olsen, 1976). Grounded in theory as well as in field studies and computer simulations, the garbage can model and the Carnegie School represent a rich tradition in organizational behavior, which has influenced a wide array of literatures, from more microlevel views of decision making to the study of groups, learning, power, and leadership.

Justification Processes and Pressures

Accountability is generally assumed to have a positive effect on the quality of decision making. Tetlock’s (1983) theory of accountability suggests that the decision maker who was effectively responsible for her decision would be more vigilant than the decision maker who was under no particular pressure to justify a decision. In a series of investigations, Tetlock and his colleagues (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) manipulated accountability, typically by informing decision makers at the outset of a judgment task that they would have to present their findings to a panel of experts or be otherwise reviewed and evaluated. Under such accountability conditions, decision makers were more accurate (Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987) and took longer to make decisions than when not under accountability pressure.

Tetlock distinguished different types of accountability, most notably process accountability (the extent to which a person or group must answer questions about how they came to a decision) and outcome accountability (the extent to which a person or group must account for the outcome or conclusion of their decision). Tetlock reasoned that process accountability was more effective than was outcome accountability in producing better decisions. Outcome accountability might lead a decision maker to arrive at a decision that would meet the approval of the organization; process accountability, on the other hand, presumably motivates decision makers to review the evidence without regard for the outcome that it might suggest.

Organizational Boundary Issues That Shape Decision Making

In recent years, the study of decision making has become decidedly more informed by an understanding of the organizational actor’s relationship to the company.

INSIDER VERSUS OUTSIDER VIEWS

Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) suggest that organizational decision makers have a strong tendency to consider the organizational problems they face as unique, when in fact problems in organizations reoccur with some regularity. Managers tend to view current problems in isolation, while discounting or neglecting past experience and statistics, which might in fact be helpful in evaluating current decisions. Kahneman and Lovallo refer to this tendency to forget the past as an “insider view” of problems, which anchors predictions about the future on plans and scenarios. Kahneman and Lovallo argue that decision makers should adopt an “outsider view” of problems, which would bring relevant data and information to bear, and allow the decision maker to disassociate him- or herself from a problem.

KNOWLEDGE VALUATION

Menon and her colleagues (Menon & Blount, 2003; Menon, Choi, & Thompson, 2005; Menon & Pfeffer, 2003) find that decision makers’ valuations of knowledge affecting their decision making are highly influenced by whether the information is perceived to emanate from organizational insiders or outsiders. Whereas traditional group research in social psychology posits a near law-like ingroup favoritism effect, Menon argues that within the organization, actors battle for status and distinctiveness (see also Sutton & Hargadon, 1996), making the use of knowledge contributed by an insider tantamount to career suicide. In controlled, empirical investigations of insider versus outsider knowledge, Menon finds that people tend to ignore, discount, and devalue knowledge that is presumably sourced from insiders, whereas the same knowledge sourced from an outsider is more carefully attended to and more highly valued. Menon and colleagues (2005) reveal that managers who have an opportunity to affirm themselves are less likely to experience status threat and therefore more likely to make use of valuable insider knowledge.

Prescriptive Approaches in Judgment and Decision Making

The question of how to mitigate or eliminate human bias in organizational decision making has received relatively short shrift in comparison to descriptive accounts of how biases emerge and operate. One explanation for this dearth of prescriptive treatments is that it is very difficult to reverse or mitigate fundamental human bias. Indeed, investigations of expert decision makers reveal that experts often fall prey to the same biases that befall novices (for a review, see Arkes & Hammond, 1986). Bazerman (2006) outlines six strategies for combating bias in individual decision making: (1) acquiring experience and expertise; (2) debiasing techniques, that often involve consciousness raising about biases; (3) analogical reasoning that involves highlighting biases that occur across a range of situations, allowing decision makers to induce a common theme (cf. Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner,

1999); (4) taking the outsider view; (5) using linear models; and (6) understanding biases in others.

Justice and Fairness

Pay and access to resources are critical concerns for most organizational actors. Not surprisingly, rewards and resource allocation, as well as actors' reactions to allocation decisions, are therefore central topics in OB. Research that sheds light on the processes by which organizational actors assess fairness, as well as the consequences of those assessments, is important for two reasons. First, it presents a limitation to the traditional economic perspective of individuals as atomistic, self-interested actors from a microperspective. In addition, it contrasts sharply with research on interpersonal decision making (e.g., Messick & Sentis, 1985; Ross & Sicoly, 1979), which focuses on individuals' egocentric preferences for maximizing their own utility relative to others. By placing the study of individual judgments into the contexts in which people interact, we get deeper insight into socially situated decision-making processes.

Although OB is interested in the factors that affect our assessments of what is just, and the consequences of those judgments on organizational outcomes, it also goes beyond the individual level of analysis to consider the effects of social context on justice assessments, as well as the implications of those assessments for organizational systems. This literature therefore considers the effect of the perceiver's relative position within the social system on his judgments (e.g., Kray & Lind, 2002; Mossholder, Bennett, & Martin, 1998). It also considers the implications of individual perceptions of fairness on the social system itself (e.g., Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002; Greenberg, 1993; Johnson, Korsgaard, & Sapienza, 2002; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996). We deal with both of these topics, paying special attention to the negative consequences of procedural justice assessments in the workplace: sabotage and revenge.

Assessing Procedural Justice

Because most OB research is situated within organizational contexts, it is not surprising that the implications of the organization as a social context are primary to OB studies of procedural justice assessments (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Inasmuch as organizational structure shapes patterns of interaction and relative participation in decision making, it has clear implications for procedural justice assessments. Actors in highly centralized, vertically complex organizations, where individuals participate less in decision making and face more levels of hierarchy, generally feel a lower sense of distributive and procedural fairness (Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000; Schminke, Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002). Similarly, actors within larger and more formalized organizations—those marked by lower levels of social integration and fewer relationships based on intimate personal contact, and where decision making may be more political—also feel less distributive and procedural fairness (Randall, Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999; Schminke et al., 2000, 2002). These effects are not

felt across all levels of an organization, however. Because more control and higher returns accrue to those in higher echelons, higher-ranking actors feel a greater sense of justice than do those in the lower ranks. Likewise, those at higher levels are more forgiving of structural impediments to fairness, so that rank moderates the effects of structure on assessments of justice (Schminke et al., 2002).

Within a given organizational setting, actors' assessments of justice and fairness are likely to be often influenced by those with whom they interact on a daily basis. Thus organizational actors' assessments of justice are moderated by both the context in which those assessments are made as well as their relationships with the other actors involved in the event or process being scrutinized (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Coworkers' assessments of procedural and distributive justice often influence individuals' own assessments (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; Steil, 1983), just as the treatment of other employees during the process of being laid off affects survivors' assessments of fairness (Brockner & Greenberg, 1990; Brockner, Grover, Reed, DeWitt, & O'Malley, 1987; Brockner et al., 1994), perhaps because actors focus on the potential implications for themselves of processes they see affecting others (James & Cropanzano, 1990).

In contrast, assessments are often based, at least in part, on prior personal experience (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Consequently, organizational actors are more likely to feel empathy when they have experienced injustice themselves (Kray & Lind, 2002). Similarly, the degree to which an actor has interacted with those involved in the focal event, particularly the authority figure perceived to be the source of the injustice, moderates perceptions of fairness (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Kray & Lind, 2002; Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001).

Because much work within organizations focuses on the work group, the dynamics of interaction within such small groups have significant consequences for justice assessments. When organizational actors identify strongly with their work unit, their individual reactions are often filtered through group identification. This effect can be so strong that when authority figures violate neutrality or trust relative to individual team members, other members of the team perceive those actions as violations against the entire work group (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Similarly, perceptions of decision fairness are more associated with the degree to which the decision represents the interests of all group members than of individual group members (Miller, Jackson, Mueller, & Schersching, 1987). Consequently, members of work units are likely to share assessments of justice, affecting other types of employee attitudes, as well: work-unit-level procedural justice assessments explain more variance in individual job satisfaction than do individual perceptions of justice (Mossholder et al., 1998).

Consequences of Procedural Justice Assessments

Assessments of procedural justice at the group level affect the level of individual, self-reported job satisfaction.

Job satisfaction is not the only motivational outcome affected by perceptions of fairness, however; procedural and distributive justice assessments are relevant to an actor's evaluations of many and varied aspects of his organizational environment. Distributive justice, for example, accounts for more variance in satisfaction with compensation than does procedural justice (Folger & Konovsky, 1989). In contrast, perceptions of fairness regarding the performance appraisal process have a direct impact on an actor's trust in his supervisor, whereas perceptions of fairness regarding pay determination, performance appraisal and communication regarding compensation directly impact an actor's commitment to his or her employing organization (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Scarpello & Jones, 1996). Similarly, the interaction of distributive and procedural justice moderate the effects of each, such that high procedural justice assessments reduce the effects of distributive justice on employee organizational commitment but heighten the effect of distributive justice on employee self-evaluation or self-esteem, implying that actors use information on procedural fairness to make self-attributions for their own outcomes (Brockner et al., 2003).

At the intraorganizational level, Kim and Mauborgne (1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1996, 1998) find that managers of foreign subsidiaries judge the strategic decision-making process to be fair when bilateral communication exists between the head office and subsidiary involved; subsidiaries are able to challenge and refute the strategic views of managers in the head office; managers in the head office are well informed regarding local conditions of the subsidiaries; subsidiaries are given a full account of the strategic decisions of the head office; and the head office applies decision-making procedures consistently across subsidiaries (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991, 1993b). Not only do these factors influence subsidiary managers' perceptions of procedural justice, they also increase subsidiary managers' willingness to comply (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993a), as well as to engage in extra-role behavior (Kim & Mauborgne, 1996).

Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) find that the same cognitive and motivational processes that operate in individual perceptions of justice are also at work in inter-organizational relationships. Because entrepreneurs cannot build high-potential businesses without the financing and participation of outside investors, harmonious entrepreneur-investor relations are paramount (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Larson, 1992). When entrepreneurs provide timely feedback, reducing the need for investor vigilance, investors' perceptions of procedural justice increase, particularly when investors' influence over organizational decisions is relatively low (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996).

The Dark Side: Negative Assessments of Procedural Justice

Although organizational justice research has long identified revenge or retaliation as a means of restoring justice (e.g., Adams, 1965), only recently have OB researchers sought to test this assertion empirically. These studies demonstrate the moderating mechanisms that deter-

mine whether and how retaliation will be delivered, as well as the importance of interpersonal interaction in assessments of justice. Perhaps the most important question regarding the dark side of justice is *when* actors will take revenge. Retaliation appears to depend on the assignment of blame, and the type and degree of perceived injustice. When they assign blame, actors are more likely to take revenge against the perceived offender and less likely to reconcile with the perceived offender (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001). Sabotage is a specific type of retaliation in which a person actively tries to destroy another person's character, property, personal effects, and so on. The type of injustice actors feel also determines the type of sabotage they engage in and their goals in doing so: Those who feel distributive injustice are more likely to engage in sabotage to restore equity, whereas sabotage resulting from interpersonal injustice aims to retaliate against the transgressors. Although interpersonal injustices engender the most severe forms of sabotage or revenge, severity increases with perceived distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice (Ambrose et al., 2002; Greenberg, 1993).

In addition to the perceived source of injustice, the target of revenge affects the type and degree of retaliatory behavior in which an actor will engage. In general, wronged actors seem to use revenge to restore their feelings of justice, not to perpetuate the cycle of injustice. Thus the target of sabotage is most often the source of the perceived injustice, such that retaliatory action is seldom taken against individuals when the roots of the injustice are perceived to be structural (Ambrose et al., 2002; Greenberg, 2002). This reluctance is partially in the interests of self-preservation; low-status actors are less likely to take revenge on higher-status actors than are high-status actors on lower-status actors, although the tendency to take revenge decreases with the victim's absolute status (Aquino et al., 2001). Similarly, revenge is judged less harshly when its consequences are symmetric with the instigating injustice, whereas judgments are harsher when the method of revenge is similar to that by which the initial injustice was enacted (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002). Because revenge is often visible and subject to third-party evaluation, victims focus on aesthetic principles in deciding when and how to retaliate.

Both assessments of justice and fairness and the consequences of those reactions are highly salient to organizational functioning and outcomes. By supplementing the findings of laboratory research with participant observation, interviews, and surveys, organizational behavior is able to understand the interaction of these phenomena with other organizational processes and relationships much more deeply than it could if study were limited to the laboratory. The same is true of organizational behavior's treatment of the related topic of leadership; by moving the study of leadership, and particularly its consequences, out of the laboratory and into the field, we get a much clearer picture of how and why leadership matters.

Leadership

Perspectives on leadership in organizational behavior draw heavily on social psychology and industrial and or-

ganizational psychology. In OB, the focus of leadership studies is the individual actor within the organizational context, rather than individual differences. Therefore, we ultimately look to a discussion of social capital and networks and organizational power and influence—topics we address systematically in subsequent sections—to understand leaders in their organizations fully. In this section, however, we focus primarily on individual leadership styles and their consequences. We do not take up the age-old question of whether leaders are born or made (see Bryman, 1996, for a summary), but we outline three or streams of research on leadership within organizational behavior: leadership style, the consequences or impact of leadership, and leadership biases and blind spots.

Leadership Style

The study of styles of leadership in organizational behavior can be traced to Lewin, Lippitt, and White's (1939) studies of children's reactions to different leaders' approaches. Since then, research has gone in many different directions, from social-exchange theories to individual trait theories (see Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002, for a review). OB researchers generally leave these issues aside, however, to focus primarily on how leadership shapes subordinate performance and satisfaction. Pearce and Sims (2002), building on Manz and Sims's (1991) and Bass and Avolio's (1993) models of leadership behavior, provide a model of five primary leadership types: directive leadership, aversive leadership, transactional leadership, transformational leadership, and empowering leadership. Here we focus on the latter three.

Transactional leadership can be understood as developing and fulfilling a contract with subordinates. Grounded in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), equity and exchange theory (Adams, 1963; Homans, 1958, 1961), and reinforcement theory (Luthans & Kreitner, 1985; Scott & Podsakoff, 1982), transactional leadership is associated with personal and material rewards conditional on performance, providing clarification and feedback relating to goals and managing by exception. Because expectancy theory suggests that individuals attempt to maximize expected returns to performance, transactional leadership focuses on clarifying the effort-reward relationship to maximize motivation, giving rewards equitable to input, and motivating higher subordinate input through the provision of higher rewards. Finally, transactional leadership emphasizes reinforcement through rewarding desired behavior.

Transformational leadership, in contrast, highlights the benefits of inspiration, charisma and overarching values in maximizing subordinate performance and satisfaction (Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 1990). Transformational leaders elevate their subordinates' goals and give them confidence to exceed leaders' expectations. This tradition is rooted in charismatic leadership (House, 1977) and transforming leadership (Burns, 1978) and suggests that managers engage in impression management, articulate ideological goals, define subordinate roles in terms of ideological values, engage in role modeling, communicate high expectations and confidence in subordinates,

and arouse appropriate follower motives. Transformational leaders provide vision, express idealism, communicate inspiration and high performance expectations, challenge the status quo, and set high performance expectations (Bass, 1998). Although it aims to help subordinates realize their potential, subordinates often see transformational leaders as exceptional and thus become dependent on the leader for inspiration and guidance (Yukl, 1998).

Building on transformational leadership and the "new leadership approach" (Bryman, 1996), Manz and Sims (1980, 1987, 1989, 1991, 2001) describe empowering leadership. This leadership style involves developing follower self-leadership and self-management skills, and can be called "SuperLeadership" or "leading others to lead themselves" (Sims & Lorenzi, 1992, p. 295). The roots of empowering leadership lie in behavioral self-management (Thorenson & Mahoney, 1974), social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), participative goal setting (Erez & Arad, 1986; Locke & Latham, 1990), and cognitive-behavioral modification research (Meichenbaum, 1977). Fundamentally, this school holds that by modeling self-leadership behavior, leaders induce their subordinates to become similar self-leaders. Thus empowering leaders often reconceptualize obstacles as opportunities for learning (Manz & Sims, 1989, 2001) and set specific and difficult goals to stimulate performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). They emphasize independent action, teamwork, self-development, and self-reward and encourage participative goal setting, transforming followers into leaders (Bryman, 1996).

Consequences of Leadership

Although some OB scholars argue that organizational outcomes are marginally, if at all, affected by leadership (House & Aditya, 1997; Yukl, 1999), there is evidence of a causal link. Using archival statistics for professional baseball, Kahn (1993) finds that there is a strong correlation between the quality of managers' transactional leadership, team success, and player performance. Not only do higher-quality managers—measured by predicted pay relative to salary based on overall market trends—achieve better winning percentages, controlling for player skills, but also, players tend to perform better relative to prior performance the higher the manager's quality (Kahn, 1993). This study also suggests that transactional leadership, although often treated as problematic by OB scholars, can be quite consequential in certain contexts; further research regarding the limits of transactional leadership may therefore be merited.

Similar findings emerge not only for professional sports but also in more typical organizational settings. Transformational leadership, in particular, has a positive impact on subordinate performance. In a field study in which army officers were given training in either exclusively transformational or a variety of leadership techniques, transformational leaders had a more positive impact on direct follower development and indirect follower performance than did the control group (Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002). Although transforma-

tional leadership leads subordinates to identify with and become dependent on their leaders, it also leads to subordinate empowerment in terms of individual and collective self-efficacy and organization-based self-esteem (Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 2003); this relationship is partially mediated by subordinates' social identification with the group.

The relationship between transformational leadership and organizational outcomes seems to be linked to subordinate self-concordance, or the degree to which subordinates' own goals and values are aligned with those articulated by the leader (Bono & Judge, 2003; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). By presenting work in terms of values and ideology that transcend individual interests, transformational leadership leads subordinates to internalize their leader's and group's goals, giving them internalized motivation, which is associated with more extra-role behavior and lower intention to leave (Bono & Judge, 2003; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Employees see their work as more self-expressive, thus consequently perform better, and are more motivated, committed to their organizations, and satisfied with their leaders (Bono & Judge, 2003).

Even transformational leadership does not improve organizational outcomes under all conditions. For example, CEOs with transformational leadership styles improve organizational performance only when actors across the organization perceive environmental uncertainty (Waldman, Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001). Uncertainty appears to make actors more receptive to charismatic leadership and gives CEOs more discretion in their actions and behavior toward subordinates, with consequences for firm profitability, controlling for external influences. CEOs with transactional leadership styles, in contrast, do not improve firm performance, even under uncertainty (Waldman et al., 2001). Similarly, although transformational leadership is associated with improved future performance, it does not have a relationship to prior firm performance, suggesting a strong causal relationship between leadership and future performance (Waldman, Javidan, & Varella, 2004).

Leadership is clearly critical to the success of self-leading or self-managing teams (Barry, 1991). Often without a formal leadership position, self-managing teams may flounder if team members have previously experienced only aversive, directive, or transactional leaders in the past, as may those who have become dependent on transformational leaders (Bryman, 1996). Self-leadership is positively related to performance when teams are engaged in conceptual tasks and when team member interdependence is either very high or very low; in contrast, self-leading teams engaged in productive or behavioral tasks increase performance at moderate levels of team member interdependence (Stewart & Barrick, 2000).

Because empowered teams are almost forced to share leadership, distributing leadership roles and influence across team members (Pearce, Perry, & Sims, 2001; Yukl, 1998), they are better equipped to self-manage. In such shared leadership teams, the agents and targets of influence are peers. Pearce and Sims (2002) find that shared leadership is more closely associated with team effective-

ness than vertical leadership, particularly in teams with transformational and empowerment leadership styles. Shared leadership is a significant predictor of self-managing teams, particularly when engaged in complex tasks (Pearce & Sims, 2002). Self-managing teams are most successful when they have external leaders who span boundaries to build relationships, interact with outside constituencies, build internal and external support, and empower their teams (Druskat & Wheeler, 2003). External leaders of self-managing teams are less effective, however, when engaging in traditional leadership behaviors (Manz & Sims, 1987).

Despite evidence to the contrary, some OB researchers argue that the impact of leaders on organizational outcomes, particularly unexpected success, is overemphasized or "romanticized" (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Because individuals need to comprehend causally ambiguous, yet significant, organizational events, to attribute outcomes to human causes, and to validate their belief that organizations are effective, they give credit for unexpectedly positive outcomes to leadership (Meindl et al., 1985). This suggests that the value of leadership lies in the ability to control the meanings and interpretations that important stakeholders assign to events. This line of research points to an important consideration: that leadership may comprise both real effects, as indicated previously, as well as the interpretational effects suggested here.

Leadership and Biases

Because leaders are in both formal and informal positions of power and control, they may rely excessively on heuristics and mental models and may thus be subject to distorted perceptions, particularly in regard to their subordinates. The approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) argues that the experience of control increases the tendency to approach and decreases the tendency to inhibit. Because they experience subjective feelings of power, leaders are likely to feel more positive and less negative emotion, and are thus more attuned to rewards than threats (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), suggesting that leaders may neglect subordinates' grievances. Similarly, leaders are likely to pay less attention to subordinates and thus more susceptible to stereotyping (Fiske, 1993). Moreover, those experiencing power are more likely to act, regardless of consequences (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).

Those evaluating leaders may also show systematic biases, which are investigated in field studies and surveys by industrial and organizational psychologists and OB researchers. Implicit leadership theory holds that, over time and through personal perceptions and expectations, employees develop implicit leadership theories (ILTs), or personal assumptions about the skills, abilities, and personal characteristics of an ideal business leader (Kenney, Schwartz-Kenney, & Blascovich, 1996) that are stored and activated when they interact with people in a leadership position. Unless actors are perceived as conforming to those characteristics, they will not be per-

ceived as leaders (House & Aditya, 1997). Because ILTs are relatively constant across individuals, work contexts, and personal characteristics, as well as over time, not conforming to ILTs (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004) may hinder a leader's effectiveness.

Women leaders are particularly affected by biased attributions. Although evaluations of women leaders overall are only slightly less favorable than those of male leaders, meta-analysis shows that women tend to suffer more significant devaluation when their leadership styles are perceived as masculine (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992). Similarly, women experience more devaluation when they occupy male-dominated roles and when their evaluators are men (Eagly et al., 1992). Women are evaluated more negatively than men even when their behavior meets the needs of a leadership role because of perceived incongruity of leadership and female gender roles, making it more difficult for women to achieve success as leaders than for men (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Evaluations of women are likely misguided, however, as meta-analysis shows that women display more transformational leadership behaviors positively related to effectiveness and fewer transactional leadership behaviors than do men (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, & van Engen, 2003).

The study of leadership—similar to the study of decision making and justice and fairness—is clearly grounded in social psychology. Nevertheless, it often seeks to understand processes and consequences particular to organizational contexts, which cannot be replicated exactly in the laboratory. By measuring and controlling for outside influences, these studies are able to isolate and analyze the unique contributions and effects of leadership on organizational outcomes.

ORGANIZATIONAL ACTOR AS TEAM PLAYER

Within OB, teams are analyzed at several levels, including the nature of the intrateam relationships (also referred to as group dynamics) as well as the relationship between the team and the rest of the organization (commonly referred to as social networks).

Groups and Teams

It is nearly impossible to talk about organizations without mentioning or understanding teams. Not surprisingly, OB has borrowed and built on social psychology's groundbreaking studies of groups. Most of the research that OB has leveraged has been prior to 1990.

Many scholars (and certainly people in the business world) use groups and teams interchangeably when they should not. A *group* is an aggregate or collection, whose participants may or may not have a (shared) goal and may or may not be interdependent; a *team* is a group of people who share a goal and are interdependent. Thus, a team is a specific type of group—ideally composed of fewer than 10 people—working toward a shared goal that has organizational relevance (Hackman, 1990). The social psychology of groups is largely descriptive; the orga-

nizational study of teams is both descriptive and prescriptive. Key OB research on groups that derives from social psychology but has been claimed by OB includes transactive memory, the common information effect, minority influence, and conflict.

Transactive Memory

A transactive memory system is a group-level information-processing system that is an extension of the individual information-processing system (Wegner, 1986; Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985). Whereas Wegner (1986) first measured and identified transactive memory systems in couples, Moreland, Argote, and Krishnan (1998) extended the concept to teamwork. In their investigation, teams were asked to assemble AM radios as part of a training experience (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996). Teams were randomly assigned to either individual training sessions or group training sessions. In the training phase, everyone—both individuals and groups—received the same information; groups were not given any explicit instructions on how they should organize themselves. One week later, the participants were asked to assemble the radios again without the benefit of written instructions. The groups that had trained as a team performed better, in terms of successfully completing the assembly and with fewer errors. Most notably, the transactive memory effect has been examined in actual work teams, including hip and knee replacement surgery teams (doctors who have performed surgery as a team have patients with faster recoveries and fewer complications; Moreland & Argote, 2003) and coal-mining injuries and deaths (Goodman & Garber, 1988).

Common Information Effect

The common information effect, or the tendency for groups to discuss information that is common to everyone, as opposed to information that is unique to individuals in the team, has been demonstrated with a variety of paradigms and group tasks (cf. Christensen et al., 1998; Gigone & Hastie, 1996; Stasser & Titus, 1985). The common information effect is regarded to be dysfunctional for groups and, in most investigations, the optimal group answer can only emerge if group members are fully sharing all information. OB researchers quickly focused on two critical implications of the common information effect: practical solutions and the interface between the type of information and the type of team members (Phillips, Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004). Practical solutions to avoid excessive focus on common information have included instructing groups to rank rather than choose (Gigone & Hastie, 1996; Hollingshead, 1996), spend an equal amount of time discussing each alternative (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994), define the goal as a "problem to be solved" rather than a "judgment to be made" (Laughlin, 1980; Stasser & Stewart, 1992), suspend initial judgment (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and record facts during the discussion that justify their decision (Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998).

Phillips and her colleagues (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996; Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Loyd, 2004; Phillips, Mannix, et al., 2004) have examined not only how the distribution of information affects the likelihood that members will consider information but also the way that friendships among group members impact the common information effect. In this way, Phillips has linked the cognitive-information-processing aspects of teamwork with the sociorelational aspects. For example, team members who are familiar with one another are less likely to make poor decisions resulting from the common knowledge problem than are teams whose members are unacquainted (Gruenfeld et al., 1996). According to Gruenfeld and colleagues (1996), this result stems from the fact that teams that are more familiar with one another tend to pool their unique information to find the best choice, while unfamiliar teams tend to aggregate their preferences and adopt the choice of the majority; this suggests that familiarity prevents teams from adopting dysfunctional responses to normative influence. Moreover, Phillips and colleagues have shown that when the distribution of unique versus shared information is congruent with the relationship status of group members, such that the unfamiliar team member possesses the unique information and the previously acquainted team members share information, teams are more likely to discuss unique and shared information and exhibit superior performance (Phillips, 2003; Phillips, Mannix, et al., 2004). Phillips, Mannix, and colleagues (2004) found that when a familiar member who was in the numerical majority held unique information, groups performed worse than when that information belonged to a stranger. Likewise, Phillips (2003) argued that it is members' assumptions of similarity (e.g., Allen & Wilder, 1975) that lead them to alter their behavior when they find that they do not agree with whom they expect to agree. For instance, individuals express greater surprise and irritation with a differing perspective when it is expressed by a socially similar other than when it is expressed by someone who is socially different (Phillips, 2003; Phillips & Loyd, 2004). Thus, the sharing of unique information and performance of groups that face hidden profile situations is also affected by who agrees with whom in the group, which is frequently a function of the social relationships among group members and the decision-making strategies they employ as a consequence.

Minority Influence

Minority influence focuses on the extent to which people that hold nondominant opinions in a group can influence a group's ultimate decision. The mere presence of a minority stimulates more thorough information and more thoughtful group decision making (Gruenfeld, 1995). Minority opinions can arise from one of two sources—from a member of one's own work team (i.e., an ingroup member) or a member of another group (an outgroup member). Both can be effective; however, a minority opinion offered by an ingroup member is often more influential (David & Turner, 1996). People in work teams are often reluctant to express divergent views and

disagreement with outgroup members is more tolerable than disagreement with ingroup members (Phillips, 2003).

Intensive examinations of actual organizations reveal that members in the majority exhibit greater integrative complexity than do members in the minority (Gruenfeld, 1995). For example, the authors of majority opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court who are exposed to members who hold a minority point of view show increases in their own levels of integrative thinking (Gruenfeld, 1995). In contrast, people exposed to majority opinions or unanimous groups actually experience a decrease in integrative thinking (Gruenfeld, Thomas-Hunt, & Kim, 1998).

One type of minority influence hinges on the length of time a person has been a member of a group. Because reorganizations are so prevalent in businesses, OB researchers have been particularly interested in how the changing composition of a group affects its productivity. Gruenfeld, Martorana, and Fan (2000) investigated the consequences of temporary membership changes for itinerant members (i.e., members who leave their core group to visit a new work group, and then subsequently return) and indigenous members of those foreign and native groups. Although it would seem that itinerant members would learn new ideas that would transfer back to their native group once they returned, this was not observed. Members of all groups produced more unique ideas after itinerant members returned to their native group than before they left or during the temporary change period. However, indigenous group members were less likely to want to include them in a group project designed to draw on knowledge of the work team. Moreover, indigenous group members regarded the itinerant members to be more argumentative than they were before their new assignment, and their contributions were perceived as less valuable. Thus, itinerant group members had less direct influence after their reorganization than before. In this sense, groups benefit from their "worldly" members, but they do not appreciate them.

Conflict

The study of conflict in teams has been almost exclusively the domain of management theorists, such as Jehn (1995; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Shah & Jehn, 1993; see also Amason, 1996; Guetzkow & Gyr, 1954). Jehn (1995) proposed that three types of conflict occur in teams: relationship conflict (also known as emotional conflict, A-type conflict), task conflict (conflict about the substance of an issue or project), and process conflict (conflict about how to do a project). Many research investigations measured the types of conflict within laboratory teams as well as actual work teams; several investigations reported that relationship conflict was negatively related to task performance, whereas task conflict was positively related to task performance (cf. Jehn, 1997). Recently, De Dreu and Weingart (2003) performed a meta-analysis of the three types of conflict; in all cases, both relational as well as task conflict was negatively related to group perfor-

mance. Behfar, Peterson, Mannix, and Trochim (2004) examined 51 work teams and found that three factors were associated with enhanced performance: members focus on content, rather than style; members assign work to others in the team based on expertise, not convenience; and members communicate about factors that affect their ability to carry out assignments, something that Behfar and colleagues call communicating about work and quirks.

Brainstorming and Creativity

Research on team brainstorming and creativity has a strong hold in psychology as well as management science. Whereas the social psychological approach to brainstorming focuses nearly exclusively on the question of why groups are inferior to individuals (or nominal groups; for a review, see Paulus, Brown, & Ortega, 1999; see also Diehl & Stroebe, 1987), the OB approach assumes that teams must be creative and consequently concerns itself with improving the effectiveness of intact brainstorming teams (cf. Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). Three subareas of research have been remarkably influential in this area: intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, psychological safety, and boundary spanning.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY

Edmondson and Mogelof (2006; see also Edmondson, 1999) explain how the presence of psychological safety in a team provides a critical foundation for creativity. Psychological safety encompasses the taken-for-granted beliefs that others will respond positively when a person takes a risk. Because the creative process involves divergent thinking, it is a risky behavior. Edmondson and Mogelof investigated several project teams and measured psychological safety at key points in time during a project. Importantly, individual differences in terms of two of the "big five" personality factors—neuroticism and openness to experience—were positively associated with greater psychological safety in teams.

CREATIVITY AND BOUNDARY SPANNING

According to Ancona (1990; Ancona & Caldwell, 1988, 1990, 1992a), for teams to be creative, they need to navigate organizational boundaries and divides. Ancona and Caldwell's (1992a) groundbreaking investigation of 45 teams reveals four prototypical patterns: ambassadorialism, task coordination, scouting, and isolationism. Ancona and Bresman (2006) suggest that creative teams, called, X-teams, "beg, borrow, and steal" best practices across the company. They distinguish the process of creative idea generation from the organizational tightrope of winning support for ideas and ultimately receiving organizational buyin. They argue that the most innovative teams have a marked disrespect for traditional teams and even organizational boundaries, and that this fluidity drives the innovative process. They identify five key components of X-teams with respect to the innovative process: external activity, extensive (network) ties, expand-

able tiers (managing up and out), flexible membership, and coordination among ties.

Hargadon (2006) argues that creativity involves two complementary but seemingly opposing processes: bridging and building. Bridging, according to Hargadon, requires that two previously distinct worlds or domains be brought together via pattern recognition or making a new connection. To this end, Hargadon provides compelling case examples from physics to rock and roll. The building process, according to Hargadon, requires that new patterns be built involving both understanding and action within those social groups that serve as the arbiters of the creative output. Hargadon bases his theory in the microsociology of creativity.

Negotiations

Negotiation research is the child of at least three literatures: Morton Deutsch's (1973) seminal work in social psychology; Raiffa's (1982) work in applied game theory; and, oddly enough, Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) work in decision making. Negotiation takes front and center stage in OB, in part because organizational actors routinely find themselves involved in intra- and inter-organizational conflict and exchange. Modern negotiation research in OB has dominated the micro-OB journals for over two decades, beginning in the 1980s when Bazerman and Neale redefined the study of negotiation as a joint decision-making process that contained the same flaws as individual decision making. We outline three central themes in negotiation research: judgment and decision making; relationships and reputation; and social perception and social identity. These themes are highly interrelated, but we distinguish them here to focus on how cognitive and motivational processes affect decision making in negotiation; how social relationships affect negotiation; and, finally, how subtle changes in context can affect negotiated outcomes.

Judgment and Decision Making

The great majority of research in negotiation focuses on the shortcomings that befall negotiators. The key finding is that negotiators are rather poor at negotiating. In one investigation, more than 40% of negotiators failed to realize when their interests were completely compatible (i.e., aligned) with others, and nearly 25% of these negotiators reached lose-lose outcomes (Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Negotiation biases fall into biases that are general in nature and negotiation-specific biases that include the framing effect, anchoring and adjustment, and overconfidence (for reviews, see Neale & Bazerman, 1991). For example, several investigations have examined the impact of framing (gain vs. loss frame) on negotiation outcomes. The general finding is that negotiators who are led to adopt a gain frame are more likely to reach settlement than are negotiators who are led to adopt a loss frame (cf. Bottom & Studt, 1993; Neale & Bazerman, 1991).

The second set of biases is negotiation specific, such as the fixed-pie perception (Bazerman & Neale, 1983;

Thompson & Hastie, 1990), coercion bias (Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988); attribution bias (Morris & Larrick, 1995; Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999), and concession aversion (or the grass-is-greener bias; Ross & Stillinger, 1991). Perhaps of all the negotiation-specific biases, it is the fixed-pie perception that has garnered the most attention. The fixed-pie perception, coined by Fisher and Ury (1983), refers to the often faulty belief that people's interests are fundamentally and directly opposed, such that a gain for one party represents a loss for the other party. Numerous research programs have established the presence and persistence of the fixed-pie perception in producing suboptimal negotiation agreements, preventing negotiators from reaching mutually beneficial agreements (cf. Bazerman & Neale, 1983). The implications of the fixed-pie perception for the quality of negotiated outcomes are serious; when negotiators believe that their interests are completely opposed, they cannot dovetail their interests.

Another well-documented general bias that has been studied in context of negotiations is overconfidence. Overconfidence refers to unwarranted levels of confidence in people's judgments of their abilities and the occurrence of positive events and underestimates of the likelihood of negative events. For example, in negotiations involving third-party dispute resolution, negotiators on both sides of the table believe that a "neutral" third party will adjudicate in their favor (Farber, 1981; Farber & Bazerman, 1986, 1989). Obviously, the third party cannot rule in favor of both parties. Similarly, in final-offer arbitration, wherein parties each submit their final offer to a third party, who then makes a binding decision between the two proposals, negotiators consistently overestimate the probability that a neutral arbitrator will choose their own offer (Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 1983). Whereas overconfidence about potential outcomes is a detriment to effective negotiation, evidence suggests that overconfidence about the value of the other party's walkaway point might serve the negotiator well. Specifically, negotiators who are optimistically biased (i.e., they think that their counterpart will concede more than he or she really can) have a distinct bargaining advantage (Bottom & Paese, 1999). Whereas negotiation research had initially been exclusively cognitive, the research tide turned and investigations of mood and emotion in negotiation grew in popularity (for a review, see Barry, 1999; Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2005). For example, several investigations have explored the implications of Forgas's (1995) affect infusion model on negotiated outcomes.

Relationships and Reputations

Somewhere in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a small rebellion took place against the overly cognized view of the negotiator. Rather than picturing him or her as a biased information processor, people began to focus on the context of the negotiation and the relationship among organizational actors. Pruitt and Rubin's (1986) dual-concern model, derived from Thomas and Kilman's (1974) concept of people and task focus, suggests that

integrative agreements result when negotiators are concerned about themselves and the other party (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt, Carnevale, Ben-Yoav, Nochajski, & Van Slyck, 1983). Several investigations have examined the impact of friendship and relationships on negotiator effectiveness (for a review, see Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995). Another aspect of relationships is the social-organizational network. Several investigations of networks in negotiations were conducted and, recently, the study of reputations in negotiation communities has become an important topic (Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). For example, Tinsley and colleagues (2002) find that negotiators who perform well in an organizational community but who then gain a reputation for being a tough negotiator encounter opponents who behave more aggressively toward them.

Glick and Croson (2001) argue that negotiators' reputations are built fairly quickly in negotiation communities and affect how others deal with them. They found that investigations of reputations in a community of MBA students yielded four profiles: liar-manipulators (who will do anything to gain advantage), tough but honest (negotiators who don't lie, but make very few concessions), nice and reasonable people (who make concessions), and cream puffs (who always make concessions). People act much tougher when dealing with someone who has a reputation for being a liar but are much more reasonable with other profiles. And, most notably, people are more likely to use tough strategies with liars for defensive reasons but might use tough strategies with cream puffs for opportunistic reasons.

Somewhat paradoxically, while people may expect that they will act tougher around those they expect to be tough, these same individuals also may be likely to cave in. Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, and Galinsky (2003) recently demonstrated that during negotiations, there can be a disconnect between individuals' intended reaction to a competitive opponent and how they actually behave. For example, MBA students reported that they would negotiate more aggressively with a competitive opponent relative to a noncompetitive opponent. However, when these same individuals conducted a negotiation 5 weeks later, the same participants who claimed they would be more aggressive when facing a competitive opponent set less aggressive expectations and ultimately agreed to worse outcomes than participants who believed they were facing a noncompetitive opponent. Why? When negotiators forecast how they believe they might behave, they fail to consider their motivation to reach an agreement.

The rise of the Internet era ushered in a new area of research on the impact of communication modality (face-to-face, telephone, email, etc.) on negotiation outcomes (for a review, see Nadler & Shetowsky, 2006). In general, it is believed that the richer the communication medium, the better the negotiated outcome (cf. Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999); however, negotiators who are not prepared or are in a relatively weak bargaining position are best advised to negotiate via email (Loewenstein, Morris, Chakravarti, Thompson, & Kopelman, 2005).

Social Perception and Social Identity

The classic study of social perception in negotiation is that of Kelley and Stahelsski (1970) who found that the outcomes of a multiround Prisoner's Dilemma Game depended on the parties' perceptions of one another as well as their social stereotypes in general. Kramer and Brewer (1984) used social identity theory to predict how negotiators would behave in a social dilemma task. They hypothesized that negotiators might be more cooperative if they shared a common identity. They examined the incidence of competitive and cooperative behavior in a social dilemma task. Although the stakes and payoffs were exactly the same across conditions, when group members were told to focus on a superordinate identity, they behaved more cooperatively (donated more to a common pool of resources) than when they were instructed to focus on their individual identities. In a similar sense, Ross and Ward (1996) found that people playing a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, titled "the Wall Street game," were much more competitive than people playing the same game when it was titled "the community game."

Morris and colleagues (1999) examined how people develop impressions of others in negotiations based on their behaviors. Morris and colleagues reasoned that negotiators would fall prey to the fundamental attribution error when attempting to explain the behavior of a demanding counterpart. The situational explanation for a demanding counterpart would attribute excessive demands to the quality of that person's alternatives (best alternative to negotiated agreement, or BATNA), whereas a dispositional explanation would invoke a personality attribution. Morris and colleagues found that negotiators with attractive options outside their negotiation were indeed labeled as more demanding (dispositional attribution) than negotiators who did not have as attractive outside options.

The tidal wave of unconscious processes in social psychology was not lost on OB research. Several investigations of below-conscious-awareness information processing and negotiator behavior have been conducted. For example, Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky (2001) applied stereotype threat to the study of negotiation. They found that when gender is "primed," women perform less well than do men (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). However, they also found evidence for a "stereotype reactance" effect, wherein when gender is explicitly primed, women are less likely to identify with traditional gender roles and perform even better than do males (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002).

Research on cross-cultural negotiation differences has burgeoned in recent years (cf. Brett, 2001). One subarea within this research stream focuses on cultural differences as a personality difference among members of different cultures; another subarea in this research stream focuses on cultural differences that can be temporarily activated in people of different cultures. As an example of the first type of research, Brett and her colleagues (1998) find that direct information sharing about interests is not normative in collectivistic cultures; rather, collectivistic cultures share information indirectly, which

can be just as effective in reaching optimal outcomes. As an example of the second type of research, Seeley, Thompson, and Gardner (2003) temporarily primed negotiators to be either interdependent (similar to collectivistic) or independent (similar to individualistic) and found that interdependently negotiators are more cooperative in one-on-one negotiations, but more competitive in team-on-team negotiations.

Demography and Diversity

One of the contextual factors that influences work-team processes is the demography of the team itself, particularly the diversity of its composition. Not only does composition affect team processes and outcomes, it also affects the way team members feel about each other and their work. These effects are generally found to result from social categorization (Kramer, 1991), similarity/attraction (Byrne, 1971), and information sharing in decision making (Gruenfeld et al., 1996). The effects of work-team diversity are not limited to those created by gender or race but, rather, can stem from any characteristics used to identify others as different, which are often context specific (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998).

Organizations implement teams based on the assumption that decisions made by groups with diverse expertise and experience will be better than those made by individuals. Some, following the "value-in-diversity" school (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991), believe that diversity can improve organizational performance. Others, in contrast, show that diversity impedes group functioning (see Brewer, 1979; Messick & Massie, 1989) and argue that homogeneity might improve group performance, because similar people tend to like each other more than dissimilar people (Byrne, 1971) and undergo relatively little conflict in the course of completing a task. We review the effects on group process and performance of both task-oriented diversity (group tenure and background) and relations-oriented diversity (gender and race and ethnicity).

Task-Oriented Diversity

GROUP TENURE DIVERSITY

As argued by Pfeffer (1983, 1985), homogeneity in group tenure is generally found to lead to increased communication, social integration, and cohesion (Good & Nelson, 1971; Lott & Lott, 1965; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). Social integration may be affected by heterogeneity in tenure indirectly, through decreased, less open communication and more distortion of messages (O'Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993; Smith et al., 1994). Similarly, tenure diversity is associated with increased conflict and political activity (O'Reilly, Williams, & Barsade, 1997; O'Reilly et al., 1993; Pelled, 1993).

These findings do not necessarily indicate that tenure diversity is detrimental to team performance. Heterogeneous groups are more likely to have access to nonredundant information because their networks do not overlap (Burt, 1997). Generally, diverse groups are

better able to identify and understand multiple external cues and thus may recognize subtle changes in task demands sooner than homogeneous group members (Thompson, 1967). Similarly, diverse teams may enjoy the benefit of diverse experience in attacking complex tasks (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992b; O'Reilly et al., 1997). In addition, the conflict engendered by diversity may lead to disagreements—such as those regarding minority opinions mentioned earlier—that improve decision making (Amason, 1996; Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Pelled, 1996a). Nevertheless, heterogeneity in tenure increases turnover by creating conflict and poor social integration (O'Reilly et al., 1989, 1993; Pfeffer & O'Reilly, 1987). Together, these results suggest that tenure diversity is advantageous based on experience and perspective, but that groups may fail to realize these benefits.

FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY

Diversity in background can refer to education, functional specialty, and job experience, indicating training in different expertise, abilities, and perspectives. Because of their access to diverse skill sets and unique information, often accessed through increased communication with those outside the team, cross-functional teams are assumed to be more effective than less diverse teams (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992b; Cummings, 2004; Jackson, 1992). As with tenure diversity, however, the advantages of cross-functional teams may be squandered through the increased conflict that often accompanies diversity, or by team members' unwillingness to share information held unevenly across the team (Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). As Gruenfeld and colleagues (1996) show, heterogeneous groups perform best when information is fully shared, whereas groups that are more familiar with each other perform better when information is unevenly distributed. In addition, because it leads to the surfacing of multiple points of view and task orientations, functional diversity also increases task conflict, which improves cognitive task performance (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Pelled, 1993).

In fact, much OB research shows that teams composed of actors with diverse backgrounds are able to achieve superior performance (e.g., Barsade, Ward, Turner, & Sonnenfeld, 2000). Although functional diversity drives task conflict, because those with different specialized backgrounds are naturally more likely to disagree on process issues, this conflict leads them to think more deeply about task requirements, improving performance (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Zin, 1999). The mere fact of recognizing that diverse actors have specialized knowledge allows these groups to explore divergent and innovative ideas (Janssens & Brett, 2003). Similarly, because they look to different external cues, functionally diverse teams respond better to environmental change (Keck & Tushman, 1993; Murmann & Tushman, 1997). Moreover, intrapersonal functional diversity improves information sharing and decision quality, as team members are more willing to accept others' functional expertise (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Similarly, structurally

diverse work groups—whose members fill different roles and affiliations—achieve superior performance by exposing the group to unique knowledge and skills (Cummings, 2004). Thus, functional diversity improves performance by increasing the availability of task-relevant knowledge, leading to greater task conflict and information sharing.

Demographic Diversity

GENDER DIVERSITY

Gender is perhaps the most studied, yet least conclusive, aspect of work-group diversity. Gender is a particularly salient dimension of identification and categorization, with immediate consequences for workplace interaction. For example, Eagly's gender role theory (see Eagly et al., 1992) holds that actors develop expectations about their own and others' behavior based on their beliefs about the behavior that is appropriate for men and women, and they may evaluate women negatively when their behavior differs significantly from expectations. This is thought to be more salient and have a stronger effect for women than for men, because women are generally in the minority in the workplace—particularly in leadership roles—which reinforces negative stereotypes (Eagly et al., 1992).

There is evidence of increased conflict and process loss in mixed-gender groups (e.g., Alagna, Reddy, & Collins, 1982; Pelled, 1996b; Sackett, DuBois, & Noc, 1991), although these findings are not conclusive (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). Kanter (1977) notes that the effects of gender diversity on group process are moderated by the proportion of men and women in a given group, an issue not taken into account by most gender studies. Although gender diversity was thought to increase conflict, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis (O'Reilly et al., 1997; Pelled, 1996a; Pelled et al., 1999). Moreover, the effect of being different varies between men and women (Bacharach & Bamberger, 2004; South, Bonjean, Markham, & Corder, 1982; Tsui, Egan, & O'Reilly, 1992), partially because groups dominated by females tend to isolate male minority members less than male-dominated groups do female minority members (Fairhurst & Snavely, 1983; Schreiber, 1979). Similarly, the effect of exclusion of women from male-dominated networks is also inconclusive (Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992, 1997; Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 1996).

The findings regarding gender diversity and organizational performance are also mixed, with some studies finding positive effects on at least some measures of performance (Fenwick & Neal, 2001; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Pazy & Oron, 2001; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001), and others finding no significant effects (Richard, 2000; Watson, Johnson, & Merritt, 1998). Gender diversity may decrease perceived productivity in work groups, partially as a result of increased emotional conflict (Pelled, 1996b). Similarly, male-dominated work groups demonstrate less prosocial organizational behavior, which is also related to increased emotional conflict (Kizilos, Pelled, & Cummings, 1996). Proportionality and

gender of the focal actor are also consequential to the effects of diversity on individual outcomes such as satisfaction, commitment, and turnover (Tsui et al., 1992). Men in mixed work teams are less satisfied and have lower self-esteem than do men in male- or female-dominated teams, whereas women are most satisfied in male-dominated teams and least satisfied in female-dominated teams (Wharton & Baron, 1987, 1991). Women are more likely to leave homogeneous groups than are men, despite women's expression of greater commitment, positive affect, and perceived cooperation when working in all-female teams (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2004). Nevertheless, women are more supportive of their peers and view female superiors more positively when management is more diverse, perhaps due to higher perceived chances for advancement (Cohen, Broshak, & Haveman, 1996; Ely, 1994).

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY

Given that racial and ethnic diversity is significantly less studied than gender diversity, it is not surprising that its effects are somewhat murky. There is evidence that ethnic minorities behave more cooperatively than do Anglo-Americans in Prisoner's Dilemma Games, indicating collectivism (Cox et al., 1991; Earley, 1989). Contradictory evidence also exists, indicating that ethnic minorities behave more competitively when in the minority on a given task than do Anglo-Americans, whereas both groups are equally cooperative when in the majority (Espinoza & Garza, 1985). There is no more conclusive evidence, unfortunately, regarding racial diversity and conflict; racial diversity is found to cause emotional conflict (Pelled, 1993; Pelled et al., 1999), although not when the sample studied includes a large proportion of minorities (O'Reilly et al., 1997; Pelled, 1996b). This may be due to expectations of congruence for ingroup members, as disagreement is less disruptive to group processes when expressed by minorities or perceived outgroups (Phillips, 2003; Phillips, Mannix, et al., 2004). As with gender, proportionality seems to influence the effect of racial diversity.

The effects of racial and ethnic diversity on group performance are also mixed. Evidence from class-related group activity indicates that racially diverse groups perform similarly to racially homogeneous groups, but that they may consider more perspectives and generate more alternatives (McLeod & Lobel, 1992; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 1993). The results of field studies indicate a positive relationship between racial diversity and group creativity and implementation (O'Reilly et al., 1997). One possible explanation for these findings is "aversive racism" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), whereby individuals attempt to overtly demonstrate their lack of prejudice to compensate in situations in which perceived prejudices may be salient. Many studies, however, find no effect or weakly negative effects of racial diversity on performance (Kizilos et al., 1996; Pelled, 1996b; Pelled et al., 1999). Regarding individual-level outcomes, those in the minority are generally less satisfied and less committed to the organization, although these effects are stronger for whites

than for ethnic minorities (Riordan & Shore, 1997; Tsui et al., 1992), and such asymmetries have not been found consistently (see Bacharach & Bamberger, 2004). In summary, it seems that finer-grained studies are needed to fully understand the effects of racial and gender diversity on group process and performance.

Our review of groups and teams, negotiations, and demography and diversity is uniquely influenced by the organizational setting and the application of fundamental social psychological principles to organizational contexts. In the next section, we move more explicitly to the study of individuals embedded within the structure of organizations to examine how the reciprocal interaction of actors and their environments is affected by social psychological processes and how this in turn affects the environments in which actors operate.

THE ACTOR EMBEDDED WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION

The area of OB that is most different from traditional social psychology deals with the organizational actor as fully embedded within the organization. Here the focus is still on the individual, but the context within which he or she operates, that constrains and enables the individual's actions, is brought into much sharper focus. The organization as an identifiable and salient entity is highly developed. The focus is still on interaction of individuals, as in the previous section. However, the structure of the environment and social system plays a greater role in shaping the interaction itself. And often, the interaction has a feedback effect, influencing the social structure and environment, in turn. Because of the complexity of relationships and interactions represented by these phenomena, they are studied primarily in the field, distinguishing them from traditional social psychological research. In this section, we focus on the critical topics of social capital and networks, and power.

Social Capital and Networks

Of all programs of OB research, the study of social capital and networks, or the structure of interorganizational relationships, most explicitly views the actor's behavior as embedded in and, more important, constrained by complex social relationships and systems, as it sets all individual experiences in the context of the larger social structure, which is beyond the control of individuals. This research looks at different patterns of behavior that result from differences in structure among social systems, as well as the individual actor's relative position within those structures. The implications of network structure on macro-organizational outcomes have received a great deal of attention in sociology and strategy, whereas research in OB has focused primarily on the consequences of network structure on individual action and behavior. In this section, we first review the foundational work in this area, then review more recent research on the consequences of network composition for individual actors, paying particular attention to minority

group members, as well as consequences for organizational outcomes.

Social Networks and Embeddedness

The concept of social networks and the methodologies used to analyze them have developed through macro-organizational and sociological research over the past 30 years, moving from highly mathematical models in the natural sciences and information science to the social sciences. Granovetter (1973, 1985) provides the primary point of departure, arguing that because all interaction takes place in or is "embedded" within a social context (i.e., does not occur between atomistic actors without histories or futures), understanding that context itself is critical to understanding social interaction. Inasmuch as social networks structure small-scale, highly local interactions, they also impact the social structure in which all interaction occurs.

Granovetter (1973) also differentiates weak from strong social ties, which can be thought of as interpersonal relationships or connections within a network. Drawing on Homans (1950), Granovetter argues that the strength of a social tie is a function of the amount of time, intimacy, emotional intensity, and reciprocity that characterize the relationship it represents; that is, the more time actors spend together, the stronger their feelings of friendship and connectedness to each other. Based on homophily, assumed similarity, and cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961), the stronger the tie between two actors, the larger the proportion of ties with third parties they will have in common. Strong ties are valuable because they breed trust, openness and exchange, even in the absence of formal contracts (Granovetter, 1985). Weak ties are also valuable, however, because they can form bridges that link otherwise unconnected actors, thereby facilitating communication and diffusion across the network (Granovetter, 1973).

Strong ties may be more interesting, however, inasmuch as they engender social capital, a property of social relationships and structures that facilitates action by the actors within those structures that could not be achieved without the relationship (Coleman, 1988). That is, strong ties give individual actors access to resources that they can use to in pursuit of their own interests, and so help explain differences among individual outcomes, as well as differences among macrosocial outcomes. Similar to cohesion, social capital inheres within the structure of relations between and among actors, rather than the actors themselves. Benefits accrue to actors with social capital because strong ties give them access to valuable information channels, engender obligations and expectations of reciprocity and trustworthiness, and promote the development of norms and sanctions that make trust less risky (Coleman, 1988). The advantages of social capital inherent in strong ties grant actors access to the unique resources of others within the network, while insulating them from opportunism and exploitation. The more social capital one has, the better connected one is, and the more advantages and rewards one captures.

In contrast to Coleman's focus on the cohesive nature of social networks, Burt (1992, 1997) focuses on the opportunistic side of social networks: weak ties. Burt (1992) argues that social capital can be measured not only in terms of access to people with specific resources but also in terms of the social structure in its own right. Structural hole theory poses social capital as a function of brokerage opportunities in a network, or the ability of one actor to bridge others on opposite sides of a hole in the social network, with positive economic effects for the network. Brokerage gives the focal actor several advantages: timing benefits resulting from unique information regarding new opportunities created by needs in one group that might be served by the skills of another; the ability to bring actors from opposite sides of the structural hole together when it would be profitable, or referral benefits; and control over whose interests are served and what information flows across the structural hole (Burt, 1997). Similarly, the presence of the broker gives the network access to more, nonredundant information.

Individual Consequences of Network Position

Building on Granovetter (1973, 1985), Coleman (1988), and Burt (1992, 1997), OB researchers argue that who we know is as consequential to individual outcomes as who we are. The process of elaborating contingencies and moderators associated with individual outcomes began with Burt (1997), who argued that bridging structural holes was more valuable to actors in senior positions and to managers working across significant boundaries within or across the organization. To do their jobs effectively, actors occupying such positions must capitalize on their social ties, whereas their access to and control of information and opportunities gives them more entrepreneurial prospects, making them seem more capable and more creative than others. Thus, structural hole brokers tend to be promoted earlier than their peers, although because they extract value from the uniqueness of their opportunities, the value of their social capital decreases as the number of actors occupying similar positions increases (Burt, 1997).

Not only does relative position within the network structure impact material outcomes, it also has consequences for effectiveness, performance, and satisfaction. Network centrality—the number of direct contacts and access of a given actor within a network—should, for example, increase individual performance, inasmuch as it bestows information and referral benefits to the focal actor. This relationship is contingent upon the type of network, such that centrality in friendship and communication networks is associated with satisfaction and performance, whereas centrality in adversarial networks lowers satisfaction and performance (Baldwin, Bedell, & Johnson 1997).

Although networks and social capital are largely structural theories, their impact on individual outcomes can be based on perception alone. For example, being perceived of as having high-reputation and high-status friends within an organization boosts the focal actor's reputation, although actually having such a friend has no

incremental effect on reputation (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994). Similarly, actors with more accurate mental representations of intra-organizational networks are seen as more powerful, independent of their informal and formal structural positions (Krackhardt, 1990). Being perceived as prominent within a given network is often a function of being visible, affiliated with central organizations, and connected to a social network through both strong and weak ties (Burt, 1982; Cole, 1979; Cole & Cole, 1973). These same characteristics also make actors poor self-estimators, making more internal attributions based on downward social comparison (Cerulo, 1990; Festinger, 1954). Thus, prominent scientists, for example, overestimate their own productivity when their prominence is attributed to internal effort or personal characteristics, whereas they underestimate their relative productivity when their prominence is attributed to external circumstances (Cerulo, 1990).

Social Capital and Minority Groups

The impact of who you know is particularly salient for minority group members. A great deal of research therefore focuses on the impact of the structure of network ties on outcomes consequently achieved by minorities. In general, minority group members benefit from having heterogeneous, nonoverlapping networks, whereas majority group members benefit from having homogeneous networks characterized by multiplex ties. Men generally have more multiplex, homophilous, and strong ties than do women and are more likely to hold central positions in organizational interaction networks; in contrast, women are more likely to differentiate their personal networks, gaining social support and friendship from other women, but instrumental access through network ties to men (Ibarra, 1992).

Like women, minority managers tend to have more racially heterogeneous and fewer intimate network relationships than do nonminorities (Ibarra, 1995). Nevertheless, minorities achieve the best outcomes when they use different groups as social resources. Minority group members with the highest potential for advancement balance the number of cross-race and same-race ties and high-status and low-status ties within their networks, ensuring themselves access to both information and psychosocial support (Ibarra, 1995). Because they maintain potential status distinctions, differentiated networks of this sort may also be beneficial to the interaction of racially heterogeneous work groups. Although actors in racially homogenous groups that segment work-related and nonwork relationships experience lower levels of behavioral and psychological integration with their work teams, similar segmentation in the context of racially diverse work teams actually increases in-team integration (Phillips, Rothbard, & Dumas, 2004).

These findings highlight the need for minority group members to proactively manage their social networks to achieve superior organizational outcomes, as heterogeneous and differentiated networks do not readily emerge for most minority group members. Distinctiveness theory (McGuire, 1984) suggests that actors identify with

others with whom they share a relatively rare characteristic within a given social context, because relative rarity heightens the salience of such characteristics. Relative minority group members, therefore, tend to make identity and friendship choices within their own minority groups, rather than with the majority group (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 1998), although Ibarra's (1992, 1995) research points to superior outcomes for those with more balanced networks. Integration into heterogeneous networks may be more difficult for women than for racial and other minorities, however, as racial minorities' relative network marginalization tends to result from individual preferences for same-race friends, whereas women's marginalization is attributable more to exclusionary pressures than to preferences for female friends (Mehra et al., 1998).

Organizational Consequences of Social Networks

At the intraorganizational level, just as network structure influences the process of microinteraction, microinteraction influences network structure, and hence the organization itself. Networks have a significant impact on employee turnover, which tends to occur in clusters, based on employee positions in advice networks. When actors see others in similar positions leaving an organization, they tend to reconsider their options and alternatives, and ultimately leave, as well (Krackhardt & Porter, 1985, 1986). Similarly, attitudes toward work are often subject to the social influence of those with whom an actor interacts regularly and are similar to those of structural equivalents, or actors in similar positions (Erickson, 1988; Krackhardt & Brass, 1994; Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1990; Rice & Aydin, 1991). Evaluations of job design are also affected by network position; actors' evaluations are influenced by those with whom they interact most frequently (Krackhardt & Brass, 1994; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Power, leadership, and motivation are also partially determined through network membership and position (Krackhardt & Brass, 1994).

When OB researchers go beyond the individual level, the material consequences of network structure become more apparent. Field studies at the business-unit level, for example, demonstrate that network structure can help explain outcomes related to information transfer. Strong ties between business units within the same organization are more capable of transferring tacit, complex, uncodified, and interdependent knowledge from one to the other than are weak ties. Nevertheless, weak ties are capable of enabling the transfer of simple, codified, and independent knowledge (Hansen, 1999). Thus the ability of an organization to exploit its own knowledge internally, and hence to innovate and to compete, is contingent upon the structure of its own internal networks. Uzzi (1997, 1999) finds similar results at the interorganizational level in his field studies. The trust, information, communication, and coordination ability inherent in strong ties that are embedded in multiplex relationships—that is, relationships that are both social as well as transactional—lower the cost of transacting among members of such relationships, as they do among

members of networks marked by strong ties (Uzzi, 1997, 1999).

Although social capital and social networks can be built and used instrumentally, the study of social networks does not focus explicitly on their strategic use. Rather, such research generally falls into the domain of power and influence, to which we now turn our attention.

Power and Influence

Organizations are influenced and characterized by the search for and exercise of power. Whereas social psychology deals extensively with the behavioral antecedents and consequences of power and its phenomenological experience (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982; Keltner et al., 2003; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & Dolnik, 2000; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003; etc.), and interpersonal influence and persuasion (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b, 1979a, 1979b; Petty & Krosnick, 1995), OB is more concerned with power as a social phenomenon, situated within the organizational context.

Most OB research on power posits competing views of dependence relationships within organizations or systems. Ocasio (2002) identifies three main schools of thought: the functional school, which sees power emerging in response to organizations' efforts to interact with and manage their environments; the structural school, which emphasizes the criticality of structural position in determining power relationships; and the institutional school, which highlights the role of culture and institutions in distributing power (Ocasio, 2002). Such explanations are not fully satisfactory, however, given the often mixed empirical support for resource dependence theories of power (Astley & Zajac, 1990; Lachman, 1989). A broader view of power has therefore been posited by Ocasio and Pozner (2004), who also take the social psychological mechanisms associated with status into account.

Functional Perspectives

Functional views of power take organizations as social systems adapting to changing environments. Power therefore accrues to the individuals and organizational subunits that contribute to adaptation, survival, and success given the problems facing an organization at a given time. March (1962) and Cyert and March (1963) develop the idea of the organization as resolving conflict with political coalitions, whose composition is contingent upon the contribution made by members given the organizational context. Perrow (1961) builds on Cyert and March by explaining that power accrues to subunits that resolve the tasks most important to the organization, which he defines as securing the resources needed to function and grow; legitimizing operations; assembling necessary skills; and coordinating member activities and relations with other organizations and consumers.

Hickson, Hinings, Less, Schneck, and Pennings (1971) find that subunits gain power to the extent that they cope

with the critical uncertainties of other subunits in a way that cannot be achieved by third parties. Thus it is not the performance of Perrow's four basic tasks that generate power but, rather, the extent to which this performance makes others dependent on the focal subunit. Hickson and colleagues also point out that power decreases as a subunit's tasks become routinized and as the information and uncertainty absorption provided by that subunit become less critical. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) argue that the most power accrues to the organizational subunits that contribute the most critical and scarce resources, and that this power is used to influence resource allocation, in turn.

Whereas these arguments are intuitively compelling, they are not always supported empirically. Functional arguments are supported when research focuses on the contemporaneous coincidence of power with control over contingencies and resources, yet in a longitudinal study, Lachman (1989) finds no correlation between control over contingencies and power over time. Similarly, Astley and Zajac (1990) find that nondirectional interdependence among organizational units is a better predictor of power than dyadic dependencies. This suggests that, in addition to resources and constraints that accrue to actors based on long-term commitments and relationships, power is a function of properties of the broader organizational system.

Structural Perspectives

Structural perspectives focus on the embeddedness of groups and individuals within the structure of social relationships embodied by the organization. They hold that it is not only the ability to perform certain functions or provide resources that generates power but also one's relative position within formal and informal organizational structures. This view is perhaps best expressed by Emerson's (1962) assertion that power is a function of the social relation, not the individual actor. Cook and Emerson (1978) demonstrate further not only that social exchange establishes power but also that the constraints and resources imposed on actors by long-term social commitments play a role. This concept has been successfully extended to multilateral relationships, such as exchange networks (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Cook, Emerson, Gilmore, & Yamaguchi, 1983; Willer, 2003), and different types of exchange (e.g., reciprocal or negotiated) (Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 1999). Brass (1984) reinforces the importance of structural position to power distribution in his study of individual power; he finds that certain actors, such as boundary spanners, are likely to accrue more power based not simply on their own abilities but because of their central and critical network positions.

Similarly, much theory and many studies show that power can accrue to actors through others' perceptions of the power and prestige associated with their positions and affiliations, rather than actual capacities and skills (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Bourdieu, 1977, 1985, 1989; Finkelstein, 1992; Krackhardt, 1990). Network position is also central to Burt's (1997) finding that social capital,

or the ability to broker network holes, is more valuable to certain organizational actors: those with relatively few peers, in senior positions, working across significant intra- or interorganizational boundaries, or who are more visible. Individual actors' personal affiliations also have implications for power attributions, as individuals in groups may use the perceived power of a new member to attribute power to the group, and outsiders may base their perceptions of individual group members on the group's reputation (Fiol, O'Connor, & Aguinis, 2001; Fombrun, 1983). Kilduff and Krackhardt (1994) show that friendship with prominent actors increases attributions of the focal actor's own power and skills.

Institutional Perspectives

Institutional perspectives on power agree that structural and functional arguments do not adequately capture the sources of organizational power, because they are embedded in institutions. Rather, they suggest that prevailing rules, norms, and culture shape both structure and function as well as power distribution. The neo-Weberian argument articulated by Jackall (1988) posits that it is both hierarchical position and the control over culture—which represents organizational values, relevant categories, and acceptable alternatives—that form the bases for power. Selznick (1957) argues that power relationships determined by the institutionalization of value-infused organizational commitments and self-definitions. This is echoed by Stinchcombe (1965) and Kimberly (1975), who pose that the structures created at an organization's founding delineate the power of individuals and subgroups, which is resistant to change. Finally, Brown (1978), Oakes, Townley, and Cooper (1998), and Thornton and Ocasio (1999) present a political-cultural approach to organizational power. Brown, supported by the empirical findings of Oakes and colleagues, describes paradigm control and control over agendas as sources of power, whereas Thornton and Ocasio find that certain determinants of power are more salient than others based on cultural framing of organizational attention.

Status and Power

In contrast to perspectives of power and organizational dependence, a more interactionist approach is taken by the sociological social psychologists who study status. This intellectual tradition is rooted in early social psychological studies of status determination in small groups (Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955). Status can be defined as one's position of honor within a social field (Weber, 1946), and it is often accompanied by beliefs about social worth, such that an actor in a given status position is generally thought to be "better than" or "worse than" an actor in a different position (Sell, Lovaglia, Mannix, Samuelson, & Wilson, 2004; Sewell, 1992). Social fields are thus marked by status structures, or rank-ordered relationships among social actors. Such hierarchies are inherently relational and contingent upon shared values within the social system; that is, two systems with mem-

bers identical on relevant dimensions but different rules of the game would have differently ranked status structures. Although they often conflate the two concepts (e.g., Berger, Conner, & Fisek's [1974] power and prestige order), these theorists explain the complex social psychological links between status and power.

One way to think about the relationship between power and status is through the mechanism of status conferral. Social actors bestow status on each other by enacting voluntary compliance, deference, acceptance, and liking without threat or coercion (Kemper & Collins, 1990). When status-conferring microinteractions are repeated through interaction ritual chains, they contribute to the definition of the macrosocial status structure (Collins, 1981). Status conferral increases the likelihood that the high-status actor will be deferred to again, implying that high-status actors can exert power through deference rather than coercion.

Another interactionist argument is presented by expectation states theory, an outgrowth of social exchange theory. This theory holds that based on their relative status positions, actors form expectations about their own and each other's abilities, skills, and performance; these expectations ultimately determine the distribution of participation, influence, and further prestige (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Humphreys & Berger, 1981). Based on intersubjective expectations, higher-status actors are given more opportunities to contribute, are more likely to offer contributions, to receive positive evaluations of their contributions, and to be influential in group decisions (Berger et al., 1974). Behavior interaction patterns develop over time into stable interactions that are consistent with the power and prestige order and are generalized to situations outside those in which the original status ordering was created (Fisek, Berger, & Norman, 1991). Status thus becomes an organizing structure for group interaction, in that it defines the terms under which power may be legitimately and acceptably used (Sell, Lovaglia, Mannix, Samuelson, & Wilson, 2004). Snyder and Stukas (1999) find that such status expectations create self-fulfilling prophecies, whereby the perceiver adopts behavior that causes the relatively high-status actor to appear to confirm the perceiver's expectations.

Social psychology has produced a number of findings that help OB scholars understand the microlevel mechanisms working on both the relatively high-status actor and the lower-status actor. High-status actors receive abundant resources, both physical and social, such as attention, flattery, and respect, giving them the phenomenological sense of power (Keltner et al., 2003). Actors experiencing a sense of power have been shown to be more likely to take action, regardless of its potential risks (Galinsky et al., 2003), to attend more to rewards and less to threat and punishment, and to be less inhibited in their behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). This engenders cognitive and behavioral effects on those with whom the relatively high-status actor interacts, as he is perceived by others as more powerful, engendering a submissive reaction on the part of the perceiver (Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). The perceiver then inter-

prets the actor's dominant behavior as an indicator of status, reinforcing the status-to-power link (Ellyson & Dovidio, 1985).

Status also has an effect on the course of that interaction. Status may increase access to resources that can be used to create dependence (Thye, 2000). Similarly, perceptions of status affect the most microprocesses of social interaction to such an extent that it can create and perpetuate feelings of power, which in turn increase perceptions of power. At the same time, one can have status without power, as well as power without status, and power use may lead to status-reducing conflict and resistance (Willer, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997). Thus, although the link between power and status is sufficient to demonstrate that power is not simply a structural-functional phenomenon, it is still insufficient to explain power alone.

Organizational behavior takes a rather broad view of power, incorporating interactionist, structural, functional, cultural, and experiential perspectives. Because it approaches power from many angles, it has yet to produce a unified theory of power. Nevertheless, this thorough investigation of power, from the psychological to the structural, will ultimately provide a comprehensive view that can be applied not only to organizational contexts but also to any arena of social interaction.

CONCLUSION

As most reviews eventually admit, we have been openly selective in our review of OB research. We focused on research that has a timeless quality and that has already spawned new streams of research. In selecting this research, we hope to show that organizational behavior is not merely an application of social psychological research to organizational contexts. Moreover, we mean to demonstrate the benefits of field research in elaborating the complex mechanisms at work in many social phenomena, particularly those involving small groups and larger social units. Finally, we intend to show how situating social psychological research within a macrosocial context such as the organization provides insight into the dynamics of social interaction, that is, the way that actors' individual responses to social stimuli influence not only their own behavior but also the reactions of other actors as well as the context in which they interact.

We have relied on a levels-of-analysis approach to guide our review of organizational behavior. In doing so, we have revealed how OB scholars define themselves. In this regard, the tensions that define social psychology (individual vs. group research) are similar to those that occur within OB. If anything, the divisions run deeper in OB. A given problem, such as an underperforming team may be accounted for via an individual level of analysis, an interpersonal level of analysis, a team approach, and in many cases a more macroapproach. OB has challenged young researchers to heal the rift and engage in what is euphemistically called mesoresearch. The idea is that a mezzanine is the floor that is halfway between the

lobby (micro) and the upper (macro) levels of the organization. Some have tried to navigate this crevasse, but many have failed.

As a field, organizational behavior could be likened to a teenager, desperately trying to gain independence from its mother and father disciplines: social psychology and sociology. Thus, far, mom and dad are not overly impressed by OB. Moreover, the ungrateful teenager enjoys all the benefits of having an influential and successful mom and father but is not reciprocating—at least judging by the frequency with which social psychology and sociology journals cite OB papers (as opposed to vice versa). And, like most teenagers, OB does not really desire to follow in mom and dad's footsteps. And, like many teenagers, OB is not bashful about wanting to take whatever new car (theory or paradigm) that social psychology might have developed out for its own spin. We suspect that as OB continues to mature, there will be a greater independence and perhaps a deepened appreciation between the two fields.

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